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Research Highlights and Abstract
This article shows:
• Clear pluralities of British survey respondents opposed their nation’s military inter-
ventions in Afghanistan and Libya.
• Opposition to involvement in the conflicts mostly a function of the costs the
missions would impose on the nation and concerns about the morality of the
missions.
• Attitudes towards the parties and their leaders are weak predictors of the respond-
ents’ attitudes towards involving the nation’s military in the conflict.
• Survey experiment reveals the positions leaders and parties took on sending addi-
tional British troops into Afghanistan did not prime support or opposition to such a
‘surge’.
Scholarship is divided on the primary drivers of public support for the use of military force.
This article addresses this controversy by comparing three competing models of British public
opinion towards the use of military force in Afghanistan and Libya. Analyses of national
survey data demonstrate that cost-benefit calculations and normative considerations have sizable
effects, but leader images and other heuristics have very limited explanatory power. These
results are buttressed by experimental evidence showing that leader cues have negligible impacts
on attitudes towards participation in a military ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. The minimal role
heuristics played in motivating citizen support and opposition to the conflicts in these two coun-
tries contrast with their significant relationship to citizen attitudes towards the British interven-
tion in Iraq. These conflicting results suggest that the strength of leader and partisan cues may
be animated by the intensity of inter-elite conflict over British involvement in military
interventions.
Keywords: public opinion; foreign policy attitudes, British politics
Over the past decade, the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused
thousands of casualties and cost trillions of dollars. Students of international rela-
tions and public opinion have reacted by making sustained efforts to delineate the
factors governing citizens’ decisions regarding whether to support or oppose such
conflicts. Significant strides have been made, but understanding is still incomplete
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due in no small part to data limitations of various kinds. Studies that examine
attitudes towards war over time (e.g. Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998)
have relied on aggregate data, thereby blunting the ability to explain individual-
level variations in such attitudes. Studies that do examine war support at the
individual level (e.g. Liberman 2006) often rely on datasets created primarily for
other purposes and the range of theoretically interesting explanatory variables is
limited.1 Although the growth in experimental research in political science has
helped to identify factors that shape attitudes towards war (e.g. Herrmann et al.
1999; Berinsky 2007; Gartner 2008; Gelpi et al. 2009), statistical power concerns
typically prevent the use of factorial designs that incorporate multiple relevant
dimensions in a single study. Yet another hurdle to developing a broad under-
standing of public attitudes towards war is that, to date, most of the relevant
opinion data has been gathered in a single country—the United States. These
several data limitations mean that there are few studies that permit direct com-
parisons of the ability of theoretically motivated rival models to make general
claims. In consequence, forces shaping public opinion in a vital policy area
remain imperfectly understood.
The present article attempts to inform understanding of war support/opposition
by bringing competing theoretical concerns together in a series of rival models
designed to explain variations in public opinion about British involvement in two
important recent military conflicts. Specifically, we examine British opinion about
the war in Afghanistan as well as opinion about providing military support for
rebels attempting to overthrow Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. Explanatory
models of interest focus on cost-benefit considerations, morality concerns and
several possible decision-making heuristics. Multivariate analyses of data gathered
in the Continuous Monitoring Survey (CMS) component of the 2010 British Elec-
tion Study (BES) demonstrate that cost-benefit calculations and normative con-
cerns have strong effects on attitudes towards military involvement, but party
leader images and other heuristics have much less explanatory power. Additional
supporting evidence for the minor effects of leader cues is provided by a national
survey experiment examining support for a British contribution to the ‘surge’ in
forces in Afghanistan. The conclusion reprises major findings and discusses impli-
cations for understanding factors influencing public opinion about Britain’s
involvement in wars and other militarized international disputes.
Data for the Afghanistan analyses were gathered in a large, representative national
survey (N = 21,195) of the British electorate conducted in February 2009. This
survey was commissioned as part of the ongoing Continuous Monitoring Survey
(CMS) component of the 2010 British Election Study (BES). Two monthly CMS
surveys, fielded in March and April of 2011 (N = 2145) were used to measure
British public opinion toward the military intervention in Libya.2 The surveys
included questions measuring approval or disapproval of the British missions in
Afghanistan and Libya, as well as questions tapping judgments about the morality,
costs and benefits of Britain’s participation in the conflict, and beliefs about whether
the mission would end in success. Other questions focused on a variety of poten-
tially relevant political opinions, attitudes and beliefs such as party leader images,
party identification and risk acceptance-aversion as well as media consumption
patterns and socio-demographic characteristics.
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Three Theoretical Perspectives on Public Opinion
and War
In this article, we seek to combine three explanations for war support that are both
complementary and competing: (1) cost-benefit calculations (or prudence), (2)
moral-reasoning (or principle), and (3) elite cues plus demographic factors (heu-
ristics). These theoretical approaches are complementary in the sense that each is
likely to contribute to explaining war support, but they are competing because
research to date strongly contests which is the most important factor. To shed light on
the question of the relative importance of these factors, we combine the three
approaches in a single empirical analysis by adapting a model specification familiar
to students of political behavior—Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) P*B - C + D model
of the calculus of voting turnout. We discuss each of the three approaches in turn
to explicate their theoretical motivations and how we incorporate them into a
unified empirical framework.
Prudence
A prominent strand in recent research on public opinion formation focuses on
rational decision-making encompassing a broad range of political issues, including
decisions about war and related aspects of foreign policy. Proponents of this
approach assert that citizens perform cost-benefit calculations when making up
their minds about the desirability of using force to settle international disputes (e.g.
Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Larson 1996; Herrmann et al. 1999; Gelpi
et al. 2005/2006, 2007 and 2009; Gartner 2008). Although points of emphasis and
particulars vary, these studies (all conducted in the United States) share a common
framework—citizens think rationally about why their country is going to war while
also taking into account what costs are to be paid.3 When it comes to decisions
about the use of military force, the public is ‘pretty prudent’ (Jentleson 1992).
One potential criticism of the existing ‘reasoning citizen’ studies of public opinion
about war is that although theoretically the models are about costs and benefits,
empirically there has been a heavy focus on costs (e.g.; Mueller 1973; Gartner and
Segura 1998; Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, 2007 and 2009). There has much less empha-
sis on benefits, perhaps because that is a more difficult concept to measure (and
possibly impossible to measure with aggregate data).4 As elaborated below, we
address this concern by directly asking about the level of benefits survey respond-
ents expect from the nation’s involvement in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya.
A second critique of the ‘reasoning citizen’ line of foreign policy attitude research is
more fundamental—following Converse’s (1964) classic study and numerous
ensuing works on mass belief systems (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997), the claim
is that most citizens are not capable of making the kinds of cost-benefit calculations
that rational actor models require. It is further argued that people rely on readily
available cues—what Gigerenzer (2008) calls ‘fast and frugal heuristics’—to make
high stakes political judgments in contexts of substantial uncertainty (see also
Kahneman et al. 1982; Gigerenzer et al. 2011; Kahneman 2011). For example,
Berinsky (2007; see also Berinsky and Druckman 2007) argues that the process by
which citizens make judgments about war is one where people ‘follow the
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leaders’—adopting positions based on perceptions of the positions taken by political
elites. However, it is important to note that the elite cues literature is far from
monolithic, a topic which we consider in greater detail when we discuss heuristics
below.
To incorporate the cost-benefits component in our more general explanatory
model, we employ an expected utility specification. The model has three predictor
variables: B for benefits, C for costs and P, a probability of success term (which
discounts B). With theoretically motivated variables for the P, B, and C terms, this
specification allows us to integrate key features of several existing models of
attitudes towards war—including perceptions of success (e.g. Feaver and Gelpi
2004; Gelpi et al. 2009), benefits (e.g. Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998),
and costs (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998; Karol and Miguel 2007; Kriner
and Shen 2007). We consider both collective (societal) and personal costs. The same
basic formulation has been used extensively in analyses of voting turnout (e.g. Blais
2000; Clarke et al. 2009a and 2009b). While originally proposed to explain electoral
participation (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), we believe that it is generalizable to
other political phenomena.
Perhaps the largest difference between applying the model to political participation
and attitudes towards war is the meaning of the P term. While the probability of a
single voter being decisive in an election is generally extremely small (Gelman et al.
1998), it is in some measurable way possible. The same is not true for war support;
it is difficult to think of a mechanism by which an ordinary citizen’s actions could
be decisive. This observation does not lead us to dismiss the discounting of B by P,
but rather suggests interpreting P in a way consistent with the war support litera-
ture. Given the hypothesized importance of perceptions of success in understanding
opinions about war (Eichenberg 2003; Gelpi et al. 2005/2006 and 2009; Gartner
2008), we interpret the P term as a subjective judgment of the likelihood of success
of a conflict. Accordingly, our empirical measure for the P term is an 11-point
(0–10) scale tapping beliefs concerning the likelihood of the war being successful.5
It also is important to consider the meaning of the B and C variables in the model.
As discussed above, benefits may be the most difficult measurement task for a
public opinion cost-benefits model. Citizens may view many different benefits as
coming from a war. To account for this variation in perceptions of benefits, we use
a general measure to tap the concept of collective benefits of successful prosecution
of the conflict. Specifically, the B variable is a five-category Likert-scale based
on a question asking respondents whether they agree or disagree with the state-
ment that ‘Britain will benefit in the long run from participating in the war in
Afghanistan’.6
Regarding costs, the primary way of measuring them in existing research on public
opinion and war has been to use statistics on military casualties. However, most of
these studies rely either on aggregate-level time series data or individual-level
experimental data rather than cross-sectional survey data such as we employ here.
(Assuming that the data of interest are gathered within the relatively short time
horizons encompassed by typical public opinion surveys, costs measured in casu-
alties will essentially be constant.) Another problem is that when calculating the
expected utility of war, someone could be concerned about the personal (egocen-
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tric) costs that might be incurred or the collective (sociotropic) costs that one’s
country might experience. Here, we measure these two types of costs separately
with responses to five-category agree-disagree questions. Perceived personal costs
are ascertained by asking survey respondents whether they think Britain’s involve-
ment in the Afghanistan conflict ‘threatens the safety of [their] family and [them-
selves]’ and collective costs are assessed by asking whether the war in Afghanistan
will ‘seriously damage British interests around the world’.
In sum, the cost-benefit model of approval of the war in Afghanistan is:
Dis Approval f Success Collective Benefits Colle( ) = + ∗( )( −β β β0 1 2 ctiveCosts
PersonalCosts− )β3 (1)
In this model the dependent variable is measured by answers to a question asking
respondents if they approve or disapprove of Britain’s involvement in the war
against the Taliban in Afghanistan,7 and the b’s are parameters to be estimated.
Covariates, i.e. the benefits and costs variables, are treated such that strong agree-
ment is coded ‘5’ and strong disagreement is coded 1’.
Principle
Just as the cost-benefit model is motivated by the conjecture that prudential
considerations guide how people think about participation in international military
conflicts, the morality model emphasizes the importance of moral principles. The
model’s claim is straightforward: moral considerations not only should, but actually
do, inform public opinion about the desirability of engaging in wars. There is a
strong tradition in political philosophy of the importance of morality in attitudes
towards war. The morality model’s origins are rooted in writings about interna-
tional relations that extend back over several centuries, finding expression in the
ideas of philosophers such as Aquinas and Kant. In the 20th century these ideas
informed the design and implementation of international collective security mecha-
nisms espoused by liberal-minded politicians acting in the Wilsonian idealist tradi-
tion (see, e.g. Holsti 1996/2004).
These political thinkers and politicians prefer to see countries resolve their differ-
ences with others through peaceful negotiations conducted in the framework of
international organizations established for this purpose, but they do not rule out the
possibility that a resort to war will occasionally be necessary and morally justified.
For example, thirteenth-century philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas laid out guide-
lines for a ‘just war theory’ which provides criteria for deciding whether militarized
inter-state conflicts are legitimate. In Aquinas’ view, a war is only defensible if a
country suffers injustices inflicted by an opponent. Modern extensions of the theory
state that the war should be fought with appropriate force, within internationally
agreed-upon conventions, and non-combatants and civilians should not be harmed
(Mosley 2009).
Much more recently than Aquinas, there is also considerable empirical support that
moral reasoning affects attitudes towards war. In particular, Liberman (2006, 2007)
and Stein (2011) find that desires for punishment and retribution are strong
predictors of these attitudes. When target states violate international norms, then
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some people support war because they believe the transgressors should be punished
for what they have done. While support for the death penalty is often used as a
proxy for this type of moral reasoning, we employ a more general measure because
a desire for punishment is not the only form of moral reasoning that could affect
war support. The central point is that citizens are capable of making normative
judgments about highly publicized military conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan.
The morality model used to test the conjecture that such normative concerns
influence public (dis)approval of the Afghanistan War is:
Dis Approval f Morality( ) = +( )β β0 1 (2)
The dependent variable again is the five-point scale measuring approval/
disapproval of the war, and the b’s are parameters to be estimated. The morality
variable is based on responses to the statement: ‘There is a strong moral case for
Britain participating in the war in Afghanistan’. These responses are scored on a 1
to 5 scale, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’).
Heuristics
As discussed above, research in political psychology and experimental economics
indicates that many citizens use readily available cues to help them make decisions
in situations in which the stakes are high and reliable information is in short supply.
In the realm of public opinion about important government policies, political
parties and their leaders often serve as key cue-givers, and citizens are prone to rely
on them when asked to consider topics remote from their daily experiences.
Existing literature suggests an important mechanism by which these cues operate
involves citizens’ affect toward parties and leaders. In their work on the ‘likeability’
heuristic, Sniderman et al. (1993) argued that people use feelings about parties and
leaders to infer the positions of those groups and individuals on salient issues. In
addition, research on ‘hot cognition’ by Lodge and Taber (2000) and others (e.g.
Redlawsk 2002) indicates that people use their feelings about parties and leaders to
evaluate the (de)merits of the issue positions they advocate. Taken together, these
studies suggest that affect prompts an endogenous flow of inference and assess-
ment. The larger claim is that such affective heuristics have powerful effects on
public political psychology. Reviewing studies on the impact of affective heuristics,
Kuklinski and Quirk (2000, 161) conclude that: ‘[i]n the constant interaction and
cognition, emotion generally dominates’.
In terms of recent scholarship, Berinsky (2007; 2009, ch. 6) is perhaps most
associated with a more ‘pessimistic view’ of understanding cue-giving, maintaining
that elite cues tend to exert influence via in-group/out-group dividing lines—
whether it is partisanship (as in the contemporary US politics) or nationality/
ethnicity (which was a factor in shaping World War II opinion). Boettcher and Cobb
(2006) argue that citizens’ opinions about war can be sensitive to even minor
framing effects (though also see Boettcher and Cobb 2009). Similarly, Johnson and
Tierney (2006) contend that public perceptions of war-related events can be sub-
stantially divorced from what is actually occurring on the ground, a disconnect
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caused by political elites and media sources. However, these findings may not be
antithetical to a cost-benefit approach—they show that support is sensitive to the
information available.
It is worth pointing out that not all models that rely on cue-taking reject a
cost-benefit approach. Larson (1996) develops a cue-taking model of war support
that explicitly posits a cost-benefit calculation by citizens, arguing that domestic
consensus is an important driver of war support. Grieco et al. (2011) argue that
citizens present a model of cue-taking from international organizations that is also
consistent with a cost-benefit model in that those who exhibit low confidence in
the president look abroad for a ‘second opinion’ on the merits of force (also see
Chapman (2009) for a more formal treatment). Similarly, Kull and Destler (1999)
hypothesize that international cues are important, arguing that international con-
sensus is key to understanding war support.
Some additional research finds that cues have relatively weak effects. Gelpi
(2010) finds that partisanship is not a strong factor in shaping how people per-
ceive the information they receive about the Iraq war. To be sure, there are
strong main effects for partisanship but it does appear that party identification
serves as a moderator of news about events or of messages from President Bush.
Similarly, Nicholson (2010) finds that elite cues have limited power in a series
of experiments covering war initiation, support for an ongoing war, and war
termination.
Given the mix of results described above, recent research has attempted to explain
which elites are important cue-givers and when those cues will be effective. Not
surprisingly, the overall information environment (i.e. framing) is central to under-
standing support for war generally (Aday et al. 2005; Berinsky and Kinder 2006;
Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Johnson and Tierney 2006; Johns 2009). This line of
research is also beginning to show just how important the news media are for
shaping and controlling this information environment (Baum and Groeling 2009;
Aday 2010; Althaus and Coe 2011). Whether a member of the political elite can
shape public opinion on war depends on who is saying it, what is being said, and the
overall information environment in which they are speaking.
The case of British support for the Afghanistan War demonstrates the challenge
that parties and leaders can face when it comes to public opinion on matters of
war and peace. All three major British parties consistently have maintained that
their country’s role in combating the Taliban in Afghanistan is vital for eradicat-
ing the scourge of international terrorism. These claims notwithstanding, numer-
ous polls indicate that public support for involvement in the conflict is weak and
has steadily declined over time, with sizable majorities now saying that the war
is not winnable and that British troops should be brought home ‘immediately’ or
‘soon’.8
There are other dispositional and demographic factors that could influence attitude
formation about war. Risk orientations are one such factor. When asked about
potentially threatening events such as wars, people may consult their general
orientations about the desirability of engaging in risky ventures. Accordingly, we
conjecture that, ceteris paribus, risk-averse individuals will be less likely to support
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the Afghanistan mission. Socio-demographic characteristics also may be associated
with attitudes towards military involvement. Foremost among these variables are
gender and age, and we investigate whether often-articulated conjectures that
women and young people are more negatively disposed towards international
conflict are empirically valid (e.g. Elshtain 1987; Inglehart 1989; Eichenberg 2003;
Goldstein 2003; Clements 2012; see also Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009). We also
investigate the impact of ethnicity. Although we do not study the attitudes of
specific national groups, we predict that people designating themselves as being of
Asian ethnicity will be less supportive of the Afghan conflict. This is because in the
British case most of these people have Pakistani, Indian, or Bangladeshi origins.9
These are nations with a British colonial heritage, and this history might make these
peoples particularly skeptical of a renewed British military presence in the region.
In addition, the war has had a direct impact on peace and stability in Pakistan,
which shares a long, highly porous border with Afghanistan.
Given the preceding discussion of how the media influence the overall informa-
tion environment, media consumption is also of interest. The British print media
regularly take positions on important political issues, and in the past decade
several major newspapers have done so with regard to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Here, we categorize survey respondents by whether they regularly
read newspapers that support or oppose British involvement in Iraq, read a news-
paper that has not taken a stand, or do not read a newspaper at all. Finally, we
consider social class, a variable that traditionally has been accorded pride-of-place
in research on mass political behavior in Britain (e.g. Butler and Stokes 1969).
Social class may be relevant for understanding views towards the Afghan War
because people in different classes may have varying attitudes towards war given
their differing propensities to serve in the military or have close family and
friends who serve. In addition, factions in the Labour Party and other prominent
spokespersons for the working class historically have been closely aligned with
disarmament campaigns and pacifist movements (e.g. Vickers 2011). The idea
that war is to be resisted because ‘workers are ones who fight’ has a lengthy
history on the British left.
In sum, the heuristics model is:
Dis Approval f Partyid Risk News Leaders( ) = + + + +
− − −
β β β β β0 1 4 5 7 8 9 11(
+ + + + )
− −
β β β β12 14 15 16 20 21Ethnicity Gender AgeCohort Class (3)
Less parsimonious than its rivals, this model specifies opinions about the war as
a function of: (a) four 0–1 dichotomous variables tapping party identification
(reference category = no party identification); (b) three dichotomous variables
tapping risk appetite (very accepting, somewhat averse, very averse; reference
category = somewhat accepting); (c) newspaper readership (pro, neutral/do not
read, con)10; (d) three 11-point (0–10) feeling thermometer variables measuring
affect for the major party leaders: David Cameron (Conservative), Gordon Brown
(Labour) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat); (e) three ethnicity dummy variables
(white-non-British, Asian, other; reference category = White British); (f) gender
(female = 1, male = 0); (g) four dichotomous age-cohort variables (reference
category = over 65); and (h) social class (1 = middle/upper, 0 = working/lower).
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Public Opinion and the Afghanistan War
Circa February 2009 when our survey was conducted, the British public voiced
considerable skepticism about the desirability of their country’s involvement in the
Afghanistan War. As Figure 1 shows, less than one person in five (18 per cent)
approved of the war and less than one in twenty (4 per cent) strongly approved. In
contrast, a majority either disapproved or strongly disapproved (30 per cent and 21
per cent, respectively) of British participation in the conflict. An additional one-
quarter (27 per cent) said either they ‘neither approved nor disapproved’ or ‘didn’t
know’. This stands in stark contrast to the high levels of public approval for the use
of British troops in Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on
America. Polls conducted in the initial months of the conflict showed that over 60
per cent of the British public favored British ‘boots on the ground’.11
Negativity about participation in the war was not confined to particular groups.
Rather, majorities or large pluralities in all age, ethnic, gender and social class
groupings reported that they either disapproved or strongly disapproved. That said,
Figure 2 documents that older persons were more likely to disapprove than were
younger ones, with the percentages doing so climbing from 43 per cent among
people in the 18–25 age group to fully 64 per cent among those 66 or older.
Differences among ethnicity and gender were also substantial, with Asians and
women being especially unlikely to approve. Specifically, only 7 per cent of Asians
approved as compared to 23 per cent of those saying they were ‘White British’.
Regarding gender, 13 per cent of women approved of British participation in the
war as compared to 32 per cent of men. In contrast, 58 per cent of women but only
44 per cent of men disapproved.
Many people also questioned the prudential basis of the conflict. Large numbers
were unconvinced about the benefits of participation, and many were concerned
about possible costs. Specifically, only about one person in seven (15 per cent)
agreed that Britain would benefit from the war, whereas nearly three in five (57 per
cent) disagreed (Figure 3). As for costs, only one person in four felt personally
threatened by the conflict. However, nearly two in five agreed with that the war
Figure 1: Approval-Disapproval of British Involvement in the War in Afghanistan
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would damage Britain’s global interests, and only about one in five disagreed. Nor
were people convinced that there was a compelling moral case for military involve-
ment. As Figure 3 shows, a substantial plurality (42 per cent) disagreed with the
idea that Britain had a strong moral case for having its military in Afghanistan, and
only slightly over one-quarter (28 per cent) agreed with it. Many respondents also
expressed doubts about the likelihood that war would have a successful outcome.
As Figure 4 illustrates, fully one person in four judged that the war was ‘very
unlikely’ to be successful whereas only one in fifty said the war was ‘very likely’ to
be successful. Overall, the mean score on the 0–10 probability of success scale was
a decidedly pessimistic 3.2.
In sum, the survey data portray a distinct absence of enthusiasm for Britain’s
military involvement in Afghanistan. Many people expressed combinations of
Figure 2: Approval-Disapproval of British Involvement in the War in Afghanistan
by Socio-Demographic Characteristics
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prudential and moral concerns, and a large majority was not sanguine about the
eventual outcome of the conflict. Thus, although mainstream political leaders
demonstrated continuing unity in their support for British participation in the war
since it began in the autumn of 2001, large portions of the public were unconvinced
of this often-articulated elite wisdom. In the next section, we investigate the ability
Figure 3: Evaluations of the Benefits, Costs and Morality of the War
in Afghanistan
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of the three competing theoretical models discussed above to explain public opinion
about the conflict.
Rival Models Considered
We first consider the performance of the cost-benefits, morality, and general heu-
ristics models separately. Since the dependent variable in the cost-benefit, morality
and heuristics models is a five-category ordinal scale, we employ ordinal probit
procedures for estimation purposes (e.g. Long and Freese 2006). The results are
presented in Table 1. The cost-benefits model (Model A) fits the data reasonably
well with the McKelvey R2 (Long and Freese 2006, 109) being 0.63. As hypoth-
esized, perceived collective benefits discounted by the prospects of success have a
significant positive effect (P < 0.001) on public opinion about the war. In addition,
perceived collective costs are significant (P < 0.001) and, as expected, the coefficient
is negative. The coefficient for personal costs is also negative, but not significant at
conventional levels (P > 0.05). Based on these results, low levels of approval for the
war can be seen reflecting the fact that few respondents thought the war would end
in success and benefit Britain, whereas many believed that involvement would
harm their country’s global interests.
The morality model also behaves as anticipated, with the b coefficient for the
predictor variable being statistically significant (P < 0.001) and correctly (positively)
signed (see Table 1, Model B). The story told by this model is straightforward—
respondents who agreed that there was a strong moral case for Britain’s involve-
ment had a significantly higher probability of approving of the conflict. Although
the morality model is extremely parsimonious, its explanatory power is quite
impressive. The model’s McKelvey R2 is 0.63, exactly the same as that for the
cost-benefits model.
Predictors in the heuristics model include party identification, party leader images,
risk orientations, newspaper readership, and socio-demographics (age, ethnicity,
gender, social class). Table 1 (Model C) shows that several of these variables have
statistically significant (P < 0.001) and predictable effects on opinion. Specifically,
Labour and Conservative identifiers are more likely than nonidentifiers (the refer-
ence partisanship category) to endorse military involvement in Afghanistan. Simi-
larly, positive images of Messrs. Brown, Cameron and Clegg, leaders of the three
major parties supporting the war, have significant (P < 0.001) positive effects, as
does readership of a daily newspaper that has endorsed support in the Iraq and
Afghanistan conflicts. As also anticipated, highly risk-averse people are significantly
(P < 0.001) less likely to approve of the conflict. In addition, a number of demo-
graphics matter. Women are significantly (P < 0.001) less likely to voice support, as
are Asians and other non-white British ethnic groups. In contrast, compared to the
oldest age group (those over 65), all younger age groups are positively disposed to
the war, as are middle class individuals.
Considering model fit, the McKelvey R2 for the general heuristics model is only
0.13, a considerably smaller value than comparable statistics for the cost-benefits
and morality models. Also, considering the full five-category dependent variable
varying from ‘strongly approve’ to ‘strongly disapprove’, the heuristics model can
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Table 1: Rival Models of Approval-Disapproval of British Involvement in the War
in Afghanistan
Predictor Variables
Model
A. Benefits-Costs B. Morality C. Heuristics
B s.e. B s.e. B s.e.
Collective Benefits*
Probability Winning 0.098*** 0.001
Collective Costs -0.506*** 0.010
Personal Costs -0.004 0.008
Morality of the War 1.171*** 0.009
Party Identification:
Labour 0.193*** 0.022
Conservative 0.215*** 0.022
Liberal Democrat 0.039 0.028
Other Party -0.133*** 0.030
Risk Orientation:
Very Acceptant -0.015 0.032
Somewhat Averse -0.005 0.016
Very Averse -0.151*** 0.026
Newspaper Readership 0.042*** 0.007
Party Leader Image:
Brown 0.093*** 0.003
Cameron 0.017*** 0.003
Clegg -0.013** 0.004
Ethnicity:
White Non-British -0.127*** 0.041
Asian -0.571*** 0.087
All Other -0.142*** 0.038
Gender -0.430*** 0.015
Age:
18–25 0.530*** 0.033
26–35 0.502*** 0.033
36–45 0.417*** 0.209
46–55 0.287*** 0.030
56–65 0.196*** 0.028
Social Class 0.031* 0.016
Cut Points: 1 -1.877*** 0.040 1.854*** 0.023 -0.290*** 0.040
2 -0.582*** 0.038 3.254*** 0.028 0.607*** 0.040
3 0.656*** 0.039 4.521*** 0.033 1.400*** 0.040
4 2.539*** 0.046 6.163*** 0.042 2.475*** 0.043
McKelvey R2 0.63 0.63 0.13
% Correctly Classified:
5 categories 56 61 34
3 categories 71 73 51
Log-likelihood -22646.36 -23143.00 -32396.32
AIC† 46299.99 45302.72 62100.27
BIC‡ 46355.96 45342.70 62300.14
N = 21915
*** P 0.001; ** P 0.01; * P 0.05, one-tailed test.
† Akaike Information Criterion, smaller values indicate better model fit
‡ Bayesian Information Criterion, smaller values indicate better model fit
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only classify 34 per cent of the respondents correctly (Table 1). This compares to 57
per cent for the costs-benefits model, and 61 per cent for the morality model.
Collapsing the ‘strongly approve’ and ‘approve’ and the ‘strongly disapprove’ and
‘disapprove’ categories yields the same pattern; the heuristics model can correctly
classify 51 per cent of the cases, whereas the costs-benefits and morality models can
correctly classify 71 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively.
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
model selection statistics (Burnham and Anderson 2002) reinforce the conclusion
that the cost-benefits and morality models demonstrate superior explanatory
power.12 For example, the AIC’s for the cost-benefits and morality models are
46299.99 and 45302.72, respectively. These values are substantially smaller (better)
than the AIC, 62100.27, for the general heuristics model. The relative magnitudes
of the BIC’s tell the same story. Although the general heuristics model includes
several predictors, it is not able to explain opinions about the war as well as its more
parsimonious rivals.
Composite Models
The preceding analyses suggest that elements of each of the three competing models
may help to explain British opinion about their country’s military mission in
Afghanistan. Although it is valuable to determine which model has the greatest
explanatory power, analyzing a composite model containing the variables from all
three models can tell us whether—once factors in rival models are controlled—
variables in particular models continue to exhibit explanatory purchase.
The results of this analysis (Table 2, Model A) reveal that success-discounted ben-
efits and collective costs continue to exert significant effects, and they are now
joined by personal costs. Moral judgments also remain significant. As for the
heuristics, the composite model indicates that approval of the war is positively
related to being a Conservative partisan, holding a positive image of Prime Minister
Gordon Brown, and newspaper readership. Approval of the war is negatively
related to being a minor party identifier, being highly risk averse, being a woman,
being less than 66 years of age, and being a member of the middle or upper classes.
As for overall fit, the composite model is able to correctly classify more cases (64
per cent—five categories and 77 per cent—three categories) and it has a larger
McKelvey R2 (0.75) than any of the component models discussed above. Also,
despite its richer parameterization, the composite model has a smaller (better) AIC
and BIC values.
Although the analysis of the composite model (Table 2, Model A) yields suggestive
results, it is possible that parameter estimates are confounded by simultaneity biases
involving opinions about the war, on the one hand, and some of the predictor
variables, on the other. To address this possibility, we re-estimate the composite
model using a two-stage-conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) technique
(Alvarez and Glasgow 1999). Specifically, we consider possible simultaneous rela-
tionships involving (dis)approval of the war and party leader images, cost-benefit
calculations and judgments regarding the morality of the war.13 The 2SCML
procedure calls for the residuals from reduced-form first-stage analyses of these
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Table 2: Composite Models of Approval-Disapproval of British Involvement in the
War in Afghanistan
Predictor Variables
Model
A. Recursive B. 2SCML
B s.e. B s.e.
Collective Benefits*
Probability Winning 0.063*** 0.001 0.062*** 0.001
Collective Costs -0.375*** 0.010 -0.658*** 0.044
Personal Costs -0.023** 0.008 -0.018* 0.008
Morality of the War 0.849*** 0.011 0.848*** 0.001
Party Identification:
Labour 0.020 0.024 -0.011 0.024
Conservative 0.108*** 0.025 0.070** 0.025
Liberal Democrat 0.019 0.031 0.026 0.031
Other Party -0.134*** 0.033 -0.127*** 0.033
Risk Orientation:
Very Acceptant -0.021 0.036 -0.016 0.036
Somewhat Averse 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.018
Very Averse -0.089** 0.029 -0.062* 0.029
Newspaper Readership 0.026*** 0.007 0.017** 0.007
Party Leader Image:
Brown 0.013*** 0.004 -0.002 0.004
Cameron -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004
Clegg -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.005
Race/Ethnicity:
White Non-British 0.019 0.045 0.017 0.045
Asian -0.483*** 0.097 -0.384*** 0.098
All Other -0.031 0.037 -0.008 0.037
Gender -0.283*** 0.017 -0.220*** 0.019
Age:
18–25 0.311*** 0.037 0.253*** 0.038
26–35 0.301*** 0.033 0.248*** 0.034
36–45 0.297*** 0.033 0.246*** 0.034
46–55 0.184*** 0.033 0.142*** 0.034
56–65 0.150*** 0.032 0.126*** 0.032
Social Class 0.040** 0.017 0.028 0.017
Collective Costs Residuals XX XX 0.286*** 0.043
Cut Points: 1 0.263*** 0.064 -0.729*** 0.162
2 1.900*** 0.065 0.910*** 0.161
3 3.451*** 0.068 2.465*** 0.161
4 5.617*** 0.074 4.625*** 0.165
McKelvey R2 0.75 0.75
% Correctly Classified:
5 categories 64 64
3 categories 77 77
Log-likelihood -19406.34 -19383.93
AIC† 38870.68 38827.85
BIC‡ 39102.54 39069.70
N = 21915
*** P 0.001; ** P 0.01; * P 0.05, one-tailed test
† Akaike Information Criterion; smaller values indicate better model fit
‡ Bayesian Information Criterion; smaller values indicate better model fit
XX, variable not included in model
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variables to be incorporated on the right-hand side of a second-stage model of
opinions about the war (see Alvarez and Glasgow 1999). Significant residuals
provide evidence of simultaneity bias. Including residuals for models of party
leaders, costs, benefits and morality variables in the composite model reveals that
the only significant effect is associated with collective costs (t = 3.12, P < 0.002).
Accordingly, we re-estimate the composite model including the collective costs
residuals together with other predictors.
An analysis of this revised composite model (Table 2, Model B) indicates that
elements of each of the three theoretical models continue to contribute to explain-
ing opinions about the war. The coefficient for success discounted collective benefits
remains statistically significant (P < 0.001) and positive, while collective costs con-
tinue to exert significant (P < 0.001) and properly (negatively) signed effects. Per-
sonal costs remain significant (P < 0.05) and negatively signed as well. Beliefs about
the morality of the conflict remain positive and statistically significant too
(P < 0.001). Variables from the heuristics model also continue to matter, with
Conservative partisanship rather than affect for the party’s leader, David Cameron,
achieving statistical significance. In contrast, identification with the Labour Party
has no influence on support for the British mission, and affect for Prime Minister
Gordon Brown is now statistically insignificant as well. These latter findings may
reflect the fact that the Conservative Party has consistently expressed unified
support for British involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In contrast,
although Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, like his predecessor Tony Blair,
strongly backed the Afghan mission, Labour was deeply split in the former case, and
many Labour elites and activists expressed only tacit support in the latter one.
Other statistically significant (P < 0.05) predictors include minor party identifica-
tion, gender, risk aversion, newspaper readership, Asian ethnicity, and age group
(see Table 2, Model B). Social class is now insignificant.
Overall, the fit of the 2SCML model is very similar to the basic composite model; the
McKelvey R2 remains 0.75, and the percentages of cases correctly classified are 64
per cent (five categories) and 77 per cent (three categories). The AIC for the 2SCML
model again indicates that a composite specification is superior to any of the three
competing models considered separately.
Given the non-linear nature of the probit functional form, it is difficult to discern
the substantive impact of various predictor variables. Accordingly, Table 3 reports
analyses that illustrate the size of the effects of various statistically significant
predictors in the 2SCML composite model. In these analyses, we compute changes
in the probability of approving or strongly approving of the war as we shift each
significant predictor in turn from its minimum to its maximum value holding other
continuous variables at their means and other dichotomous variables at 0.14 The
results reveal that collective benefits discounted by likelihood of success, collective
costs and normative judgments all exert substantively impressive effects on opin-
ions about the war. Specifically, variations in these three predictors can change the
probability of approving the war (on a 0–1 scale) by 0.87, -0.48 and 0.67 points,
respectively. In contrast, the impact of personal costs is substantively trivial (-0.01
points). All of the effects associated with predictors in the heuristics model also are
very small. Their average ability to change approval of the war is only 0.02 points
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(absolute value), with the largest effect (-0.03) being associated with membership
in the Asian race/ethnicity category.15 Taken together, these results emphasize the
importance of judgments about collective costs and benefits and moral concerns as
factors affecting public opinion on Britain’s military involvement in Afghanistan.
The Case of British Military Involvement in Libya
As an additional test of the ability of the cost-benefits, morality and heuristics
models to explain public opinion towards the use of military force, we investigate
their ability to account for reactions to British involvement in the recent multilat-
eral action against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. British involve-
ment against the Gaddafi regime occurred in a political-economic context quite
Table 3: Changes in Probabilities of Approval of
British Involvement in the War in Afghanistan
Associated with Changes† in Statistically Significant
Predictor Variables
Predictor Variables
Change in
Probability
95%
Confidence
Interval
Collective Benefits*
Probability Winning 0.871 0.836 0.908
Collective Costs -0.478 -0.553 -0.397
Personal Costs -0.007 -0.014 0.001
Morality of the War 0.669 0.648 0.709
Party Identification:
Conservative 0.006 0.000 0.012
Other Party -0.011 -0.017 -0.004
Risk Orientation:
Very Averse -0.006 -0.012 -0.000
Newspaper Readership
Race/Ethnicity:
Asian -0.029 -0.044 -0.009
Gender -0.023 -0.027 -0.018
Age:
18–25 0.026 0.015 0.038
26–35 0.022 0.015 0.029
36–45 0.023 0.016 0.031
46–55 0.009 0.003 0.016
56–65 0.008 0.002 0.014
† Continuous predictor variables are varied over their full range; multiple cat-
egory dummy variables (party identification, risk orientation, age) are set to 0,
and then each category is set to 1 in turn
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different from that which had obtained when the decision was made to employ
military forces in Afghanistan. In late winter 2011, the British economy was
suffering from the effects of the world economic crisis and a newly elected
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government had replaced Labour. Led by
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, the Coalition announced its deter-
mination to address the country’s growing sovereign debt with painful austerity
policies designed to sharply reduce public sector spending. Given the straightened
economic circumstances and continuing, decade-long, military involvement in
Afghanistan, the Coalition Government’s ability to marshal public support for even
a minimal armed intervention in the Libyan conflict was problematic.
To study the determinants of British public opinion about military engagement in
Libya, we employ data gathered in the March and April 2011 monthly BES-CMS
surveys.16 These surveys contained identical batteries of questions to those dis-
cussed above in the analyses of determinants of public opinion about British
military involvement in Afghanistan. The sole exception was that a new question
regarding the affordability of a military action against Gaddafi was substituted for
the question about personal threats posed by the operation.17
Before presenting the results of the tests of the rival models, we observe that British
military involvement in Libya did not have broad public support. Conducted only a
few days after hostilities were initiated on 19 March, the March 2011 CMS reveals
that only 30 per cent approved of British military involvement whereas a plurality 44
per cent disapproved. The operation was even less popular a month later, with less
than one-quarter (23 per cent) of the April CMS respondents approving and half (50
per cent) disapproving. Nor did the public believe there were collective benefits to be
gained from participating—in March only 16 per cent thought that Britain would
benefit in the long run and in April, only 13 per cent did so. Sizable majorities also
were worried about the costs of the operation, with 61 per cent in March and 65 per
cent in April stating that they did not think Britain could afford military action against
Libya. Nor was there a consensus about the existence of a strong moral case for the
action. In March 41 per cent agreed that there was such a case, but 34 per cent
disagreed. In April the percentage agreeing there was a strong moral case had fallen
to 31 per cent, with 37 per cent disagreeing. Finally, many people were not convinced
that Britain could carry out the operation successfully. When respondents were
asked to use a 0–10 scale with 0 meaning ‘complete failure’ and 10 meaning
‘complete success’ to evaluate the likelihood that the operation would succeed, the
mean score was only 4.7 in March and 4.2 in April.
Table 4 summarizes ordinal probit analyses of the benefits-costs, morality and
heuristics models of approval-disapproval of British involvement in the military
action in Libya using the pooled March and April 2011 CMS data. Except for the
substitution of the ‘affordability’ item for personal costs in the benefits-costs model
and an alternative measure of risk acceptance-aversion,18 all predictor variables in
the three models are identical to those used in the analyses of attitudes towards
Afghanistan presented earlier. The results of the Libya analyses are very similar to
those earlier analyses—the benefits-costs and morality models exhibit strong
explanatory power and the heuristics model performs quite poorly. Specifically,
McKelvey R2 statistics for the benefits-costs and morality models are 0.67 and 0.60,
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Table 4: Rival Models of Approval-Disapproval of British Involvement in Military
Action Against Libya, March and April 2011 BES-CMS Surveys
Model
A. Benefits-Costs B. Morality C. Heuristics
Predictor Variables B s.e. B s.e. B s.e.
Collective Benefits*
Probability Winning 0.090*** 0.003
Collective Costs:
Damage British Interests -0.488*** 0.028
Britain Can’t Afford -0.289*** 0.030
Morality of the Action 1.043*** 0.027
Party Identification:
Labour 0.099 0.073
Conservative 0.046 0.076
Liberal Democrat 0.135 0.094
Other Party -0.146* 0.089
Risk Orientation 0.030** 0.010
Newspaper Readership 0.021 0.022
Party Leader Image:
Miliband 0.046*** 0.011
Cameron 0.058*** 0.013
Clegg 0.020 0.012
Ethnicity:
White Non-British 0.006 0.130
Asian -0.460*** 0.153
All Other -0.043 0.130
Gender -0.302*** 0.047
Age:
18–15 0.017 0.106
26–35 0.243** 0.091
36–45 -0.086 0.093
46–55 -0.062 0.092
56–65 -0.126 0.126
Social Class -0.035 0.087
Cut Points: 1 -2.974*** 0.154 1.832*** 0.074 -0.341** 0.146
2 -1.812*** 0.147 2.932*** 0.084 0.347** 0.146
3 -0.523*** 0.144 4.117*** 0.100 1.100*** 0.147
4 1.208*** 0.153 5.565*** 0.120 2.139*** 0.151
McKelvey R2 0.67 0.60 0.09
% Correctly Classified:
5 categories 61 58 29
3 categories 74 71 39
Log-likelihood -2219.58 -2366.26 -3160.82
AIC† 4453.16 4742.52 6367.64
BIC‡ 4492.86 4770.87 6498.07
N = 2145
*** P 0.001; ** P 0.01; * P 0.05; one-tailed test
† Akaike Information Criterion; smaller values indicate better model performance
‡ Bayesian Information Criterion; smaller values indicate better model performance
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respectively, whereas for the heuristics model the value is only 0.09. Similarly, the
percentages of respondents correctly classified across the five approve-disapprove
categories of the dependent variable decrease from 61 per cent for the benefits-costs
model to 58 per cent for the morality model to 29 per cent for the heuristics model.
For the more general three-category classification, these percentages are 74 per
cent, 71 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively. Finally, similar to the Afghanistan
analyses, the AIC and BIC model selection statistics for the benefits-costs and
morality models are smaller than that for the heuristics model, thereby indicating
that the former two models outperform the latter one.
Regarding individual predictors, Table 4 shows that all of the variables in the
benefits-costs and morality model have statistically significant (P < 0.001) and
correctly signed effects. In the heuristics model, several predictors also are signifi-
cant (P < 0.05 or less) including two of the three leader image variables (Cameron
and Miliband). These variables have positive effects on attitudes towards the Libya
action. The analysis also shows that minor party identifiers, men and risk-acceptant
persons are more likely to favor action, whereas persons of Asian ethnicity and
those in the 26–35 age bracket are more likely to oppose it.
Similar to the Afghanistan analyses, we next analyze a composite model of attitudes
towards the military intervention in Libya that contains all of the predictors in the
three individual models. The results (not shown in tabular form) again resemble the
Afghanistan case. Specifically, the composite model outperforms the individual
models, exhibiting the largest McKelvey R2’s (.76), the largest percentage of cases
correctly classified (five category: 65 per cent; three category: 77 per cent), and the
smallest (best) model selection values (AIC = 3874.54; BIC = 4027.65). Regarding
individual predictors in the composite models, all of the benefits-costs and morality
variables remain statistically significant (P < 0.001) and properly signed. However,
none of the leader image variables approach conventional levels of statistical sig-
nificance (i.e., P > 0.10).
Viewed generally, the analyses of the Libyan data bear very strong similarities to
those for Afghanistan. In both cases the benefits-costs and morality models exhibit
relatively strong explanatory power and the heuristics model fares quite poorly. The
latter’s explanatory contributions are not wholly absent, but they are marginal once
the effects of benefits-costs and morality predictors are taken into account. The
failure of leader heuristics to exert strong effects is particularly noticeable in both
sets of analyses. The reductions of these effects to statistical insignificance or
marginality in the composite models suggest that, to the extent that leader heuris-
tics mattered in the Afghanistan and Libya cases, their effects are almost wholly
indirect. Unlike Iraq, Britain’s involvement in military actions in Afghanistan and
Libya were both instances where party leaders were agreed that British participa-
tion was desirable. This pattern, in turn, suggests that the extent of inter-elite
consensus may mediate the strength of the effects of leader heuristics on public
opinion about the use of military force. We return to this topic in the conclusion.
The negligible role party identification and leader images have on support for the
British interventions in Afghanistan and Libya contrasts with the significant impact
Clarke et al. (2009b) found partisan and leader cues played in shaping public
opinion towards the Iraq War. In one sense, the discrepancy in findings does not
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surprise as elite and party positions were divided on the former while unified on the
latter. However, negative attitudes towards the British missions, particularly in
Afghanistan, remain a curiosity because it is a situation where, although their
reasoning sometimes differed, elites from all three major parties presented a near
unified voice in expounding the importance of British military engagement in the
region.
Leaders, Parties and an Afghanistan Surge:
An Experimental Assessment
A potential criticism of the preceding findings about the weakness of party and
leader heuristics is one applicable to all statistical analyses of observational data,
namely that the analyses do not directly test the ability of elite cues to move public
opinion. Rather, the multivariate analyses demonstrate whether partisan identifi-
cations and leader images are significantly associated with variations in support
for British military operations when statistical controls for other theoretically
interesting covariates are applied. Here, we address this concern by conducting a
survey experiment regarding possible British participation in a military surge in
Afghanistan.
As noted above, the outlook in Afghanistan was anything but positive when our
survey was fielded in 2009 and new strategies were being considered. One such
strategy that had seen success in Iraq was the ‘surge’ of 2007, which involved a
focus on counter-insurgency combined with a significant escalation in the number
of troops on the ground. The result was a marked decline in the sectarian violence
that was threatening to become a full-blown civil war (Ricks 2009; Sky 2011).
Given its success, it seemed plausible that a similar surge could turn the tide in
Afghanistan.
In our survey experiment, a control group of 1,111 respondents were given infor-
mation concerning a hypothetical surge of British troops in Afghanistan that reads
as follows: ‘Britain presently has 8000 troops fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
There is a proposal to send an additional 2000 British troops to Afghanistan. Do you
approve or disapprove of sending additional troops to Afghanistan?’19 Support for
this action was markedly low, with only 18 per cent approving and 65 per cent
disapproving (the remainder were unsure or did not know).
Other respondents were randomly assigned to a number of treatment conditions,
the first four of which indicated that the either Gordon Brown or David Cameron
supported or opposed the action. In the first set of experiments, the only condition
to produce a response distribution discernibly different from the control group was
the treatment group who were told then Opposition Leader David Cameron sup-
ported the action. In this instance, support for the surge rose slightly to 23 per cent
of the respondents and opposition fell to 60 per cent.20
The second set of treatments set up a scenario where the Prime Minister and Leader
of the Opposition took opposing stances on the surge. The distributions of responses
from the treatment suggesting that Gordon Brown supported the action with David
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Cameron in opposition were not significantly different from one another. However,
when Cameron is in support of the policy, support again rose very slightly—to 21
per cent.21
Additional treatments mentioned parties instead of party leaders. The results
resemble those for the leader treatments just described. Specifically, respondents
receiving treatments mentioning either the Labour or the Conservative parties’
stances had response distributions that were not statistically different from those for
the control group. The two groups of respondents who were told either: (i) the
Conservatives support the surge or (ii) the Conservatives support the surge but
Labour opposes it were both significantly but only slightly more supportive of the
action than was the control group. The former group (Group i) had 19 per cent who
supported the surge and 62 per cent who opposed it and the latter group (Group ii)
had 22 per cent who supported the surge and 64 per cent who opposed.
Overall, the very weak treatment effects in the survey experiment are consistent
with the results from the multivariate statistical analyses of factors affecting public
attitudes towards British military involvement in Afghanistan and Libya. The direct
effects of elite cues range from negligible to very modest.
Conclusion: When Heuristics Fail
Recent scholarship is divided on the primary drivers of public opinion on war.
Although some analysts argue that opinion can be modeled as a cost-benefits
calculation, others argue that judgments about the morality of a conflict are para-
mount, and still others maintain that public opinion is guided largely by cues such
as those provided by political leaders and other elites. Above, we have used data
gathered in a 2009 national survey to investigate the ability of these three com-
peting models to explain public opinion about Britain’s military involvement in
Afghanistan. Additional analyses of the explanatory power of these models used
2011 survey data on public attitudes regarding British military support for Libyan
rebels attempting to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi. In addition, we reported the
results of a survey experiment that investigated if partisan and leader image cues
affected levels of support for a possible British military surge in Afghanistan. The
multivariate analyses of the Afghan and Libyan cases demonstrate that both
the cost-benefit calculations and normative considerations have strong effects. In
contrast, the impacts of various heuristics are much weaker. Leader images, parti-
sanship, media consumption patterns, risk acceptance/aversion, and various socio-
demographics including gender, age, ethnicity and social class all fail to account for
variations in opinion about the Afghanistan and Libyan cases. The weakness of
party and leader cues is also apparent in the experiment concerning possible effects
of these cues on support for a military surge in Afghanistan. Taken together, these
several results testify that a combination of prudence and principle were the main
drivers of British public opinion about military involvement in Afghanistan and
Libya. Affective cues and other heuristics mattered (much) less.
Present findings suggest interesting avenues for future research. Analyses demon-
strating that prudential and principled considerations both have sizable effects on
public opinion about Britain’s military actions in Afghanistan and Libya echo results
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of a recent study of attitudes toward British participation in the Iraq War.22 Whether
combinations of principle and prudence also work in tandem to provide strong
explanations of public opinion in other countries about other wars is an intriguing
research question.
The failure of elite cues to exert sizable effects on public opinion in the Afghan and
Libyan cases is also interesting and suggestive. Research has repeatedly indicated
that leader and partisan heuristics strongly influence electoral choice in Britain and
elsewhere,23 but their impact on public opinion about war and international affairs
more generally are less well understood. The Afghanistan case is one where weak
to negligible leader and partisan effects on public opinion about the war occurred in
a context characterized by longstanding elite consensus on the desirability of British
military involvement in that country. There was a similar elite consensus, albeit of
much shorter and more recent vintage, regarding British participation in NATO
strikes against the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Again, leader heuristics had a negligible
influence in models of public opinion about the desirability of British involvement
in those strikes. These results contrast sharply with the presence of sizable leader
and partisan effects on British public opinion on the Iraq War—a conflict charac-
terized by acrimonious, protracted and widely publicized divisions in elite opinion.24
The conjecture that the strength of leader and partisan cues on public opinion about
war is animated by the intensity of inter-elite conflict merits additional inquiry in
Britain and elsewhere.
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Notes
1. However, see also Gelpi et al. 2009 for extensive survey data generated specifically to examine war
support generally and support for the Iraq War specifically.
2. The 2010 British Election Study data are available at http://bes2009-10.org. Fieldwork for the CMS
surveys containing the batteries of questions on public opinion about British involvement in the wars
in Afghanistan and Libya were conducted by YouGov PLC. For analyses documenting the representa-
tive nature of the BES, CMS and other high quality internet surveys, see Sanders et al. 2007; Clarke
et al. 2008; Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2011. Dr Scotto’s time on the project was supported by ESRC
Grant RES-061-25-0405. Data collection was supported by a British Academy Small Grant
(#SG-47045) awarded to Drs Scotto and Reifler.
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3. Although there are some exceptions, costs typically are measured by the number of military person-
nel killed. In analyses of cross-sectional survey data gathered over a period of a few days such as those
we employ here the number of casualties is basically constant. Accordingly, the models we specify do
not use casualties as a measure of costs.
4. To be clear, we are not saying that existing cost-benefit models ignore benefits. Rather, we argue that
the typical approach of using mission goal (broadly defined) as a proxy for benefits presents significant
and underappreciated problems in understanding what citizens expect to gain from war, and there-
fore in constructing cost-benefit models. Previous research has overwhelmingly shown that some
types of missions garner more support than others (e.g. Jentleson 1992; Herrmann et al. 1999; and
Gelpi et al. 2009, ch. 4). These differences in support—whether seen in survey marginals for different
military actions or across experimental treatments—strongly imply that citizens are thinking about
why their country (the United States) is going to war. Nonetheless, inferences about the benefits that
citizens perceive are indirect. To illustrate, suppose the United States is suddenly confronted with the
choice of whether to engage in a military operation to dislodge the advancing armies of ‘Attackalot’
from ‘Peaceonia’. This type of foreign policy restraint mission is the sort likely to generate fairly high
levels of support in experimental research. At the same time, we still have remarkably little under-
standing into exactly why people support this type of mission. They may see a clear and present
danger posed by Attackalot, and military involvement safeguards their person, family, or immediate
community. Or, support could be driven belief in a slightly more diffuse benefit that stopping
aggression leads to greater safety (either from Attackalot specifically, or by successful deterrence more
generally). Perhaps support is driven by an abstract belief that wrongdoers should be punished, which
means that the benefit received is retribution exacted on Attackalot. Alternately, the benefit that leads
to support for a war liberating Peaceonia is to restore freedom or to end the suffering that comes with
conquest. Analyses presented in this article are designed to encourage additional research on various
benefits that citizens see coming from war.
5. This approach is consistent with models of attitude formation which posit that perceived benefits are
not important unless citizens believe they will be attained (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980).
6. We illustrate question wordings using questions asked about the British participation in the Afghani-
stan War. Wording for questions asked about the conflict in Libya are cited in note 17 below.
7. The question wording is: ‘Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or
strongly disapprove of Britain’s involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan?’
8. See YouGov Afghanistan tracker surveys: http://today.yougov.ac.uk/archives/politics/trackers.
9. It is not possible to investigate the impact of religion since variables measuring religious affiliation and
religiosity are not included in the CMS surveys.
10. Respondents who read a daily newspaper taking a pro-war stand were coded +1; those who read a
daily newspaper taking an anti-war stand were coded -1, and all other respondents were coded 0.
Pro-war newspapers included the Daily Mail and the Scottish Daily Mail, Express, Scotsman, Sun,
Telegraph, and Times. Anti-war newspapers included the Daily Record, Guardian, Independent, Mirror,
and Scottish Mirror.
11. See Kriner and Wilson 2010 for a discussion of over-time trends in public approval of the British
intervention in Afghanistan.
12. The AIC and BIC model selection criteria include discounts for the richness of model parameteriza-
tion. The AIC formula is AIC = -2LL + 2 K and the BIC formula is BIC = -2LL + k(log N) where
LL = model log likelihood, K = number of model parameters and log N = natural logarithm of sample
size. Smaller AIC and BIC values indicate better model performance. See Burnham and Anderson
2002.
13. Instrumental variables included other predictor variables in the composite model, economic evalu-
ations, attitudes towards domestic issues such as the trade-offs between taxing and spending and
evaluations of Labour’s performance on the issue deemed most important by the respondent.
14. Changes in probabilities of approving the war are calculated with the CLARIFY program (Tomz et al.
2003).
15. Leader image effects also are quite weak if similar calculations are made using the results of the
recursive composite model (Table 2, Model A). Although feelings about Labour leader Gordon Brown
are statically significant in this model, changes in these feelings can change the probability of
approving the war by only 0.06 points.
16. For an analysis of demographic and partisan differences in support for British intervention in Libya,
see Clements 2012.
17. The question wordings are: (a) ‘There is a strong moral case for Britain participating in military action
in Libya’; (b) ‘With Britain in economic difficulties, we simply cannot afford to be engaging in military
action in Libya’; (c) Britain will benefit in the long run from participating in military action in Libya’;
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(d) ‘Involvement in military action in Libya threatens to seriously damage British interests around the
world’; (e) ‘Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a complete success, and 0 means a complete
failure, how likely is it that Britain’s military action in Libya will be successful?’; (f) ‘Overall, do you
approve or disapprove of Britain’s involvement in military action in Libya’. Response categories for
items (a)–(d) vary from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ and response categories for item (f)
varies from ‘strongly approve’ to ‘strongly disapprove’ Item (e) is a 0 to 10 scale with endpoints as
indicated.
18. The risk acceptance-aversion question used is: ‘In general do you dislike taking risks, or do you like
taking risks? Please use the scale below where 0 means ‘really dislike taking risks’ and 10 means
‘really like taking risks’ to indicate how you generally feel about taking risks’.
19. The troop increase of approximately 25% would be roughly proportional to increases discussed for
American forces.
20. A Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the treatment where respondents are told Cameron supports
the action to the control group is significant (P < 0.01). All other differences are insignificant.
21. A Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the treatment where respondents are told Cameron supports
the action and Gordon Brown opposes the proposal to the control group is significant (P < 0.01).
Opposition to the proposal among those in this treatment is 64%. The test comparing the treatment
where Brown supports and Cameron opposes to the treatment where Cameron supports and Brown
opposes is significant (P < 0.05).
22. Clarke et al. 2009b, ch. 3.
23. See, e.g., Clarke et al. 2009a; 2009b.
24. The Conservatives supported British participation in the Iraq War and the Liberal Democrats were
opposed. Labour was deeply divided, with numerous Labour MPs and many party activists decrying
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to join the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ that invaded Iraq in
March 2003. These intra-party divisions deepened as war continued. On the co-variance between the
foreign policy postures of British citizens and attitudes towards the parties and their leaders, see
Reifler et al. 2011.
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